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AN INTRODUCTION TO THE RULES AND
REGULATIONS GOVERNING NATIONAL BANKS
AND THEIR USE OF FINANCIAL FUTURES
JACK A. BARBANEL*
Trading in financial futures contracts is now the fastest growing
area of commodities transactions.' This growth is illustrated by the
geometrically expanding annual volume of trades on the Chicago Board
of Trade ("CBOT"), an originator of and leading exchange for financial
futures contracts. Since the start of trading in 1975 the volume of trans-
actions has doubled each year with over 7 million contract transactions
taking place on the CBOT in 1980 alone.' At the same time that there has
been such unparalleled growth in the use of financial futures contracts
as an investment tool, there has been an increasing awareness of the
dangers posed to the continued growth and vitality of this market by the
potential for trading abuses and the lack of understanding of the
regulatory framework. Already, abuses in the trading of forward con-
tracts for delayed delivery of Government National Mortgage Associa-
tion ("GNMA") securities' have lead to demands for increased regulation
* Vice President and General Counsel, Commodities Corporation, Princeton, N.J.;
B.A. 1972, University of Maryland; J.D. 1975, Delaware Law School; L.L.M. (Corporation)
1979, New York University. The author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance of
Daniel Goldschmidt, J.D., 1981, New York University.
I See CHICAGO BOARD OF TRADE, MARKET GROWTH, INTEREST RATE FUTURES NEWSLET-
TER 1 (June 25, 1980). On the CBOT, trading volume for May 1980 was up 148% from May
1979 levels. Id. The Wall Street Journal lists transactions in numerous financial futures on
a daily basis. The financial futures contracts covered by the Wall Street Journal are con-
tracts for British pounds, Japanese yen, Swiss francs, West German marks, Government
National Mortgage Association ("GNMA") securities. Treasury Bonds, and Treasury Bills.
Other widely traded financial futures are commercial paper, certificates of deposit, and
Treasury Notes.
The 7 million contract transactions figure does not include financial futures con-
tracts traded on the other Chicago and New York exchanges.
GNMA securities are shares in a pooled group of government-insured mortgages.
GNMA guarantees the monthly payments of principal and interest by the mortgagors in the
group to the group's shareholders. See notes 29-31 infra, and accompanying text.
GNMA was created in 1968 when the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA)
was rechartered. The GNMA's primary purpose is to aid the housing market in times of
"tight money" by buying up FNMA mortgages and by guaranteeing the mortgage-backed
securities issued under the plan described in notes 29 and 31 infra. See 24 C.F.R. §§ 300.3,
300.5 (1981). Pursuant to Title III of the National Housing Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1716-1723 (1976),
Congress structured the GNMA to attract individual investors and other previously untap-
ped sources of investment to the mortgage market, with the purpose of both increasing the
supply of affordable housing for middle-income families and assuring the availability of
home mortgages for all properties and to all potential home buyers. Bar-Levav, Trading
Abuses in Ginnie Maes: The Need for Regulation, 8 SEC. REG. L.J. 42, 43-44 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Bar-Levav].
814 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXVIII
of financial futures trading.4
In December 1976, the First Federal Savings and Loan Association
of Jasper, Alabama, reported to the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion that First Federal had received from its securities dealer written
confirmation of forward transactions that First Federal had never
authorized. The terms of the trades obligated the small savings and loan,
which had an investment portfolio amounting to $5 million, to take
delivery of $7 million worth of GNMA securities.5 Commodities trading
has long been subject to abuses perpetrated by high-pressure salesmen
in search of quick profits who are not reluctant to engage in questionable
practices.' The involvement of a bank, especially a federally chartered
bank, added a new and troubling element to a familiar scenario.
The possibility of bank involvement as the victim of classic quick
profit schemes adapted to the financial futures market was one concern
that prompted initial efforts by the federal banking agencies to set per-
missible guidelines within which a bank may trade financial futures. A
second'major concern of the regulatory agencies was the banking in-
dustry's ability to handle this very specialized area of financial activity.
Thus, the installation of self-protective mechanisms was a primary con-
cern in considering various guidelines that would permit national banks
to enter the financial futures arena. This article will review past
regulatory efforts in the area of bank investment in financial futures and
set out the current regulatory framework.
The Statutory Background of Banking and Financial Futures
Prior to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974,
("CFTC Act"),7 a commodity was defined by the Commodity Exchange
Act8 as one of a specific group of listed agricultural products.' The CFTC
Act changed the definition of "commodity" to include "all other goods
See Bar-Levav, supra note 3. In that article the author discusses the current move-
ment to regulate the Ginnie Mae market and concludes that at the very minimum what is
needed is industry self-regulation via an organization set up by Ginnie Mae securities
dealers. Alternatively, the author feels supervision of these efforts by a government agency
or direct regulation by the SEC might become necessary. Id. at 65-68. See text accompany-
ing notes 164-81 infra on the recent REPORT OF THE JOINT TREASURY-SEC-FEDERAL RESERVE
BOARD STUDY OF THE GOVERNMENT RELATED SECURITIES MARKETS which has recommended
new and more extensive federal regulation of GNMA and related markets.
I Rustin, Securities Firm's Flop Reveals Big Risks Run by Some Small Banks, Wall
St. J., Oct. 28, 1977, at 1, col. 6. The bank refused to accept delivery of the GNMA securities
and its dealer was forced to cover at a loss of more than $220,000. Id.
' Recent scandels involving trading in commodity options, Great Britain and the
United States have also signaled prospects of increased regulatory enforcement efforts.
' Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-22 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as CFTC Act].
' Commodity Exchange Act § 545, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936) (currently codified at 7 U.S.C.
§§ 1-22 (1976)).
' 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
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and articles ... and all services, rights, and interests in which contracts
for future delivery are presently or in the future dealt in."'" Once the
CFTC Act enacted the change in the definition of "commodity", the door
was opened to the trading of financial futures contracts on commodity
exchanges and boards of trade.
Responding to the economic needs of the increasingly unstable
United States economy of the middle 1970's, the CBOT applied for and
was granted approval from the CFTC to initiate trading in a contract for
the future delivery of mortgage-backed securities guaranteed by the
GNMA. Subsequently, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange obtained per-
mission to initiate trading in futures contracts for the delivery of 90 day
United States Treasury Bills. These futures contracts were for the
delivery of a standardized quantity of interest rate sensitive financial in-
struments or securities on an agreed standard future date at an agreed
price, determined by both the current and expected market value of the
instruments.' Investors who expected to have free funds for investment
in securities at a point in time in the near future could use the futures
contracts to fix the cost and return of that future investment and thus
be protected against the possibility that investment yields would decline
(securities will rise in price and/or decline in return) in the interim
period between the date the contract is made and the delivery date. Con-
versely, investors who expected to have securities for sale at a future
date could use the futures contracts to protect themselves against the
possibility that the selling price of these securities would decline in the
interim.
Under the National Bank Act of 1864, ("Act")'2 a National Banking
Association is permitted to purchase and sell for its own account only
"investment securities."'3 The Act defines "investment securities" as
"marketable obligations, evidencing indebtedness . .. in the form of
bonds, notes and/or debentures..."' Clearly, equity issues and any form
I Id.
" The futures market can add significantly to efficient capital management by banks
and other financial institutions that have a large percentage of their commitments in long-
term, fixed-interest-rate instruments. Many bond portfolios contain older bonds carrying
relatively low interest-rate returns. By taking advantage of a short-term, interest-rate
futures market and taking either a long or short position on anticipated short-term,
interest-rate changes, an institution can realize gains that will upgrade total investment
returns. Banks can use futures in a long hedge by buying them to protect the government
securities trading area against falling interest rates on future purchases. They can also use
futures in a short hedge by selling them to hedge the cost of future CD purchases,
Eurodollar borrowing, or federal funds transactions. INTERNATIONAL MONEY MARKET,
TREASURY BILL FUTURES 19 (1977) [hereinafter cited as TREASURY BILL FUTURES]. See
generally Lower & Ryan, Futures Trading By National Banks, 98 Banking L.J. 239 (1981).
12 12 U.S.C. § 21-215 (1976). The Act has been amended several times since its original
passage in 1864.
.3 Id. § 24.
" Id. § 24(7).
1981]
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of commodities or commodity futures lie outside the bounds of this nar-
row definition. The Act also states that "nothing herein contained shall
authorize the purchase by the association for its own account of any
shares of stock of any corporation."'" In addition, the Comptroller of the
Currency, whose office is charged with the primary responsibility for en-
forcing this provision of the Act,"6 has issued regulations declaring that
an investment security "does not include investments which are primar-
ily speculative in nature." 7 Thus, under the Act one can conclude that
trading in financial futures is not a specifically authorized transaction,
especially in view of the inherent speculative nature of commodity
futures trading.
The Act provides two exceptions to the general rule prohibiting
speculative investments. National Banking Associations are permitted
to deal in speculative securities and stocks if they do so "solely upon the
order, and the account of, [the bank's] customers. . ."" The Act further
provides that a national bank can deal in speculative securities and
stocks for its own account when the Comptroller of the Currency issues
regulations creating exceptions to the Act's general prohibition of such
activity. 9
The Federal Reserve Act" also operates to restrict federal banks in
the investments they can make. Section 4 of the Federal Reserve Act
directs each federal reserve bank to keep informed of the general
character of the investments made by its member banks in order to
determine whether any bank is making undue use of bank credit for
speculative trading in securities or commodities." Possible sanctions for
such activity are referred to in Federal Reserve regulations. The regula-
tions require each reserve bank to give consideration to any information
it might have on the character of investments made by a member bank
in determining whether to extend credit to such bank."
Various other federal statutes regulate speculative investments by
federally insured lenders. Federal banking laws limit federal home loan
banks in their investment of excess funds to "such securities as fiduciary
and trust funds may be invested in under the laws of the state in which
the federal home loan bank is located." 3 Furthermore, federal home
loan banks are directed by regulation not to seek credit from the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board for the purchase of securities. 4 Prior to 1976,
15 Id.
" Id. § 1.
" 12 C.F.R. § 1.3(b) (1981).
lB 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1981).
1' Id.
Federal Reserve Act of 1913, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251 (codified in scattered sections of 12,
15, 18, and 31 U.S.C.).
21 12 U.S.C. § 301 (1976).
12 C.F.R. § 201.5(b) (1981).
12 U.S.C. §1431(h) (1981).
2 12 C.F.R. § 531.1(c) (1981).
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federal savings and loan associations had been similarly limited to
specific categories of investments, none- of which include financial
futures."
In May of 1976, the Federal Home L6inBank Board authorized the
trading of federally guaranteed mortgage-backed securities ("Ginnie
Maes") futures contracts by member banks in the Federal Savings and
Loan System.28 These banks had always dealt in mortgages and had
engaged in trading the Ginnie Mae from the inception of the securitiesY
Thus, Ginnie Mae futures contracts were a natural vehicle for these
banks to use to hedge their investments in mortgages and mortgage-
backed securities against interest rate fluctuations. 8
The use of the futures contracts as a hedge was especially prevalent
in the period between the formation of a GNMA pool29 and the issuance
See 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c); 12 C.F.R. § 545.29 (1978), as amended by 43 Fed. Reg. 54,622
(1978) (codified in 12 C.F.R. § 545.29 (1981)).
12 C.F.R. § 545.29 (1978), as amended by 43 Fed. Reg. 54, 622 (1978) (codified in 12
C.F.R. § 545.29 (1981)).
' Ginnie Maes are codified pass-through securities by mortgage bankers and
guaranteed by the Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA). The GNMA is a
federal agency authorized to back that guarantee with the full faith and credit of the United
States. 24 C.F.R. -§§ 300.3, 300.5 (1981). These securities represent shares in a pool of
government home mortgages that are created by a mortgage banker. GNMA guarantees
Ginnie Mae holders the monthly payment of principal and interest on their shares of the
mortgages in the pool regardless of whether or not the mortgagors make these payments to
the mortgagee. The mortgagee is ordinarily a mortgage banker who'has created the pool
and issued the securities. The mortgage banker continues to handle all the administrative
duties connected with the program, but Ginnie Mae holders have no recourse against the
issuer. The sole recourse of holders is against GNMA. U.S. DEP'T. OF HOUSING AND URBAN
DEVELOPMENT, ANALYSIS AND REPORT ON ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO REGULATING THE
TRADING OF GNMA SECURIiIES 1-66 (1978) [hereinafter cited as HUD REPORT]. See note 3
supra.
11 One basic example of uses by a Federal Savings and Loan Association of GNMA
futures to compensate for expected interest rate fluctuations is a short hedge. See note 30
infra. A bank may take a short hedge to protect the value of fixed-rate investments in that
bank's portfolio, such as 30-year home mortgages, against devaluation caused by rising in-
terest rates. By selling GNMA futures in a dollar-contract amount equal to its fixed-rate in-
vestment, a bank may be able to offset any expected increase in its current cost of money
with earnings on the delivery of devalued GNMA securities. Since interest rates have risen
between the time the futures contract was made and the delivery date called for in the con-
tract, at the time of delivery the securities to be delivered will be selling far below the price
determined in the futures market months earlier. As a result, the bank, which has taken the
short position in this transaction, will make a profit on the futures contract amounting to
the difference between what a bank charg6s and what it pays for the use of money. In this
situation the bank earns a profit despite the fact that its cost of money may be increasing at
the same time that its earnings on money it has invested has remained fixed.
I A GNMA pool is formed when a mortgage lender assembles a group of Veterans Ad-
ministration (VA), Federal Housing Administration (FHA) or Farm Housing Administration
(FMHA) mortgages (i.e., government mortgages) whose aggregate value is at least $1
million. The lender then files an application with the GNMA describing the mortgage lender
and the mortgage pool that has been created. The application requests that the GNMA
guarantee the timely payment of principal and interest on the mortgage-backed securities
1981]
818 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol.XXXVIII
of the securities backed by the mortgages in the pool. During the interim
period, interest rate fluctuations are potentially the most costly for
issuers or buyers of the new securities. Since prudent banking practices
relied on trading in GNMA futures contracts, federal savings and loan
associations were permitted, by the action of the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board, to engage in such trading for hedging 0 purposes only. Sav-
ings and loan associations were limited, however, by having to match a
GNMA futures transaction either directly against the association's firm
commitments or against anticipated reinvestments in mortgage related
securities during the forthcoming 12 month period.
3 1
that the lender intends to issue. If all is in order the request is granted. The lender then
issues and sells the GNMA-guaranteed securities after the mortgages making up the pool
are first deposited for safekeeping with a federally or state regulated financial institution.
Bar-Levav, supra note 3, at 45 (citing HUD REPORT, supra note 27, at 4 and Merrill Lynch
Weld Capital Markets Group, Prospectus for the Government Securities Income Fund 6
(8th GNMA ser.) (December 18, 1978)).
Hedging is defined by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission as:
"Bona fide hedging transactions and positions shall mean transactions or positions
in a contract for future delivery on any contract market, where such transactions
or positions normally represent a substitute for transactions to be made or posi-
tions to be taken at a later time in a physical marketing channel, and where they
are economically appropriate to the reduction of risks in the conduct and manage-
ment of a commercial enterprise, and where they arise from:
(i) The potential change in the value of assets, which a person owns, pro-
duces, manufacturers, processes, or merchandises or anticipates own-
ing, producing, manufacturing, processing, or merchandising,
(ii) The potential change in the value of liabilities which a person owes or
anticiliates incurring, or
(iii) The potential change in the value of services which a person provides,
purchases, or anticipates providing or purchasing.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, no transactions or positions shall be classified as
bona fide hedging ... unless their purpose is to offset price risks incidental to
commercial cash or spot operations and such positions are established and li-
quidated in an orderly manner in accordance with sound commercial practices..
17 C.F.R. § 1.3(z)(1) (1981)
The Comptroller of the Currency has taken a narrower view of what a hedge is for banks
engaging in financial futures transactions. In Banking Circular No. 79, the Comptroller
authorized national bank participation in financial futures markets for hedging purposes
only. This Banking Circular, issued in November 1976, required: "Each and every . . .
futures contract, purchased or sold, must correspond to an appropriate cash transaction and
only be undertaken to substantially reduce the risk of loss resulting from interest rate fluc-
tuations." Coniptroller of the Currency Banking Circular No. 79, November 2, 1976
reprinted in 11973-78 Transfer Binder] FED. BANKING L. REP. (CCH) 96,977, at 82,226
[hereinafter cited as Banking Circular 79]. This requirement was later revised and cor-
respondence between each futures position taken and a specific cash position is no longer
necessary, as long as the over all effect of participation in futures and forward markets is a
reduction in a bank's exposure to the risk of interest rate fluctuations. See text accompany-
ing notes 34-37 infra.
3' 12 C.F.R. § 545.29(d)(2). It should be noted that, despite the strict limitations on
trading set out in these regulations, abuses in GNMA futures trading have occurred. See
text accompanying notes 3-4 supra.
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Thus, with the single exception of the federal savings and loan
association, it would seem that federal banking laws effectively preclud-
ed the participation of federally chartered banks in financial futures
transactions. Nevertheless, the National Banking Act provides that na-
tional banking associations shall have the power "to exercise all such in-
cidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of bank-
ing. .."32 This provision of the Act eventually was relied upon as the
statutory basis for granting permission to national banks to engage in
financial futures transactions,
Opening the Door: The November 1976 Banking Circular"
The Comptroller of the Currency, who has primary responsibility for-
the administration of the national banking laws, 4 in November 1976
issued Banking Circular No. 79.15 The circular granted permission to na-
tional banks to participate in the trading of both GNMA and Treasury
Bill3 futures, provided that they submit proposals for prior approval to
the .Comptroller. The grant of conditional permission was based on the
theory that the use of financial futures by banks to hedge interest rate
sensitive positions in other investment areas was a proper exercise of a
bank's "incidental" powers to carry on the business of banking. To in-
sure that the trading activity engaged in was actually "incidental" to
normal banking activities, the November 1976 Circular required that
each financial futures transaction: (a) correspond to a special cash posi-
tion that was being hedged; and (b) be undertaken only to substantially
reduce the risk of loss resulting from interest rate fluctations.37
12 U.S.C. § 24 (1976).
Banking Circular No. 79, supra note 30.
12 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). Under the Futures Trading Act of 1978, PuB. L. No. 95-405, § 2,
92 Stat. 866 (codified at U.S.C. § 4a(g) (Supp. III 1979)) both the Treasury Department and
the Federal Reserve Board must be consulted by the Commodity Futures Trading Commis-
sion (CFTC) before the CFTC acts on any application for the designation of a new futures
contract in government issues. Any emergency act taken by the CFTC affecting the
designation of contract markets must similarly await consultation with the Treasury
Department and the Federal Reserve Board.
The Treasury Department had been concerned with the potential danger that the
futures market might interfere with the Treasury's responsibility for managing the national
debt, especially since the low margin requirements and proliferation of applications for new
futures contracts increased the potential for trading abuses and delivery problems. Conse-
quently, the Futures Trading Act of 1978 directs the CFTC to particularly consider the im-
pact its contract designation actions will have on the debt financing requirements of the
U.S. and the integrity of the underlying market for government securities. See text accom-
panying notes 137 supra.
Banking Circular 79, note 30 supra.
In November 1976, GNMA and 90-day Treasury Bills were the only financial instru-
ments for which futures contracts were being traded. See text accompanying notes 23-28
supra. By 1981 an expanded variety of financial futures contracts were being traded on the
various exchanges. These included contracts for the delivery of Treasury Bonds, 90-day
commercial paper, and one-year Treasury Bills.
Banking Circular 79, supra note 30, at 82,226.
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In August 1977, the Comptroller of the Currency issued a supple-
ment to the November Circular. Along the lines of the earlier pro-
nouncement, the supplement authorized national banks to participate in
the "forward placement" or "delayed delivery" markets for GNMA and
other U.S. government securities. 9 The supplement, however, pro-
hibited the sale by national banks of "stand-by" options for the forward
placement, or delayed delivery, of securities." The supplement carefully
pointed out that despite the fact that the national banking laws do not
consider forward placement contracts as "investment securities,"'" their
purchase and sale was permissible because such transactions could be
considered to be an activity incidental to banking.42 The one proviso
stated in the supplement was that a bank that wishes to invest in for-
ward placement contracts must follow the Comptroller's accounting and
control guidelines.43
The November 1979 Revision of Banking Circular No. 7944
On November 20, 1979, the Comptroller of the Currency issued a
revision of Banking Circular No. 79. The circular was revised once again
in March 1980."5 The revisions made the accounting procedures for banks
trading in financial futures more flexible to reflect better the economic
reality of the transactions." In addition, the revisions exempted futures
Comptroller of the Currency Banking Circular No. 79. Supplement No. 1, August 1,
1977, reprinted in [1973-78 Transfer Binder] FED. BANKING L. REP. (CCH) 97,210, at 82,469
[hereinafter cited as Banking Circular 79 (Supp. 1)].
9 Id.
" "Stand-by" options allow a forward placement or delayed delivery broker-dealer the
discretion to deliver securities under a "stand-by" optional delivery contract. Id. The Comp-
troller has defined standby contracts as: "optional delivery forward placement contracts.
The buyer of a standby contract (put option) pays a fee for the right or option to sell
(deliver) an agreed upon amount of specified securities to the insurer of the standby con-
tract at a specified price at a specified future date." Comptroller of the Currency Banking
Circular No. 79 (2nd Rev. March 19, 1980), reprinted in [1979-80 Transfer Binder] FED. BANK-
ING L. REP. (CCH) 98,190 at 84,275 [hereinafter cited as Banking Circular 79 (2nd Rev.)].
Banking Circular 79 (Supp. 1), supra note 38, at 82,469 citing 12 U.S.C. § 24(7) (1976).
42 Banking Circular 79 (Supp. 1), supra note 38, at 82,469.
43 Id.
" Comptroller of the Currency Banking Circular No. 79 (Revised), 44 Fed. Reg. 66,722
(1979), reprinted in [1979-80 Transfer Binder] FED. BANKING L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,038, at
83,997.
" Banking Circular 79 (2nd Rev.), supra note 40.
48 Id. at 84,276-77. Until the 1980 revision the only permissible method of valuing
futures and forward contracts was the mark to method. Futures and forward contracts can
now be valued by either the mark to market method or by the mark to the lower of cost or
market method. Id. at 84,276. Another change in the 2nd Revision was that now the board of
directors can delegate their monthly obligations to review all outstanding contract positions
and ensure that the limits on futures, forwards and standby contract positions that they
have established have not been exceeded. See text accompanying notes 74-81 infra. Now a




and forward contracts associated with hedging of mortgage banking
operations from the circular's accounting requirements.47 Thus, in place
of the prior requirement that a bank match each hedged financial futures
transaction with a specific and identified corresponding investment posi-
tion, the Comptroller now required that financial futures transactions
result in a reduction of the bank's overall risk.48 By looking to the effect
of financial futures transactions on the bank's overall investment picture
rather than to a position-by-position matching of investments with finan-
cial futures hedges, the Comptroller finally had provided banks with the
flexibility they needed to effectively reduce their interest rate sensitive
risks by employing financial futures in their strategy.49 Because of the
practical difficulties in matching and identifying corresponding invest-
ment positions, the prior requirement of the original Banking Circular
No. 79 (1976) had proved largely unfeasible and difficult to administer"0
in any case.
In addition to permitting banks to engage in financial futures trans-
actions to reduce the overall exposure of the bank's investment port-
folio, the Comptroller's March 1980 Circular allowed for other uses of
financial futures. The circular permitted banks to engage in financial
futures transactions as part of their trading account-dealer activities, as
long as such transactions are "in accordance with safe and sound bank-
ing practices" and are "reasonably related to the bank's legally permit-
ted trading activities" (i.e., not being treated as trading positions in their
own right, but only as part of hedges associated with other trading posi-
tions)."' The revised circular further permitted banks to utilize financial
futures transactions to hedge52 against interest rate exposure created by
" Banking Circular 79 (2nd Rev.), supra note 40, at 84,274. Futures and forward con-
tracts associated with hedging of mortgage banking operations may be accounted for in ac-
cordance with generally accepted accounting principles. Id. at 84,277.
" Reduction of a bank's overall risk encompasses the exposure and sensitivity of a
bank's aggregate investment position to interest rate fluctuations. An example of how the
requirement of risk reduction works in practice is the following example: A bank, looking
ahead to the next three months, sees that most of its funds will be tied up in low-yield, long-
term investments at a time when, in order to compete with other financial institutions, it ex-
pects to raise the rates of interest it is paying to its sources of funds. To protect itself
against expected increases in short-term rates, the bank would sell an interest rate contract
for delivery in 3 months. TREASURY BILL FUTURES, supra note 11, at 20.
" See Banking Circular 79 (2nd Rev.), supra note 40, at 84, 274; cf. Banking Circular 79
supra note 30.
' A highly placed source within the Comptroller's office indicated during a research
interview, that the bookkeeping burden of matching each financial futures transaction with
a corresponding cash position proved to be too burdensome to be feasible; it simply was not
worth the time and effort involved in keeping track for a bank to participate in the financial
futures market. In addition, the matching requirement was insufficient insurance that only
genuine hedging was taking place. Since records could be easily manipulated to make any
non-hedging activity with alleged "matches", the requirements could not effectively
safeguard against speculative activity.
Banking Circular 79 (2nd Rev.), supra note 40, at 84,276.
Id. at 84,274. See note 30 supra.
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undesired mismatches of assets and liabilities, where one is interest rate
sensitive and the other is a fixed rate. In this way, a bank could struc-
ture future matches of assets and liabilities with similar sensitivities to
interest rate fluctuations. Furthermore, by using financial futures
hedges to increase the liquidity of existing positions, the maturities of
asset-liability matches could be more easily adjusted to reflect expected
interest rate fluctuations."
The 1980 Circular contains certain limits on the kinds of transactions
in which a bank can enter. Because a "spread"54 in the futures market
will be profitable only if a bank is correct in its estimation of the future
price relationships between the contracts being spread, the Comptroller
views such "spreading" activity as being outside the exception that per-
mits banks to trade in financial futures. 5 Similarly, arbitrage activities
in the futures market can be considered to fall outside that permissive
exception, except where the subject security is already owned by the
bank. For example, a bank would be allowed to enter into a short futures
position on a Treasury bond if the futures price was higher than the cost
of the bond in the bank's trading account.
Recognizing the need for a uniform accounting treatment of financial
futures transactions, in the revised banking circular56 the Comptroller
established a uniform reporting standard for national banks. The cir-
cular required all futures positions to be valued monthly by a consistent
method of either mark to market or mark to the lower of cost or
market." Further, the bank must recognize any losses reflected in such
monthly valuations as a current expense item and any gains as a current
income item. Because this requirement often may result in a different
accounting treatment for each side of a hedge, the accounting profession
has objected strenuously to this provision of the revised circular. The
Comptroller's office has indicated that it would be willing to accept a
reasonable alternative to this requirement provided an appropriate
industry-wide body such as the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants or Financial Accounting Standards Board would adopt the
alternative as a uniform standard.5 The accounting profession has con-
Banking Circular 79 (2nd Rev.), supra note 40, at 84,275-76.
A "spread" or "straddle" futures position consists of a long position in a nearby
delivery month which is coupled with a short position in the same commodity taken out in a
later delivery month, thus locking in a particular difference or spread in price between the
two delivery months.
See Banking Circular 79 (2nd Rev.), supra note 40, at 84,275-76.
SId.
5' Id. at 84,276.
5 Id.
11 BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, STATEMENT OF POLICY CON-
CERNING BANK HOLDING COMPANIES ENGAGING IN FUTURES, FORWARD AND STANDBY CON-
TRACTS ON U.S. GOVERNMENT AND AGENCY SECURITIES, 45 Fed. Reg. 61,595 (1980), COMM. FUT.
L. REP. (CCH) 21,090 (1980) (codified as 12 C.F.R. § 225.142(d) (1981)) [hereinafter cited as
BANK HOLDING COMPANY POLICY STATEMENT]; Letter to Paul Jons, Executive Vice Presi-
[Vol. XXXVIII
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sidered reasonable alternative accounting standards to those required
by the revised banking circular."0
In essence then, the revisions of Banking Circular No. 79 reiterated
the proposition that banks may engage in financial futures transactions
pursuant to their incidental powers to carry on the business of banking
and prescribed policies and procedures consistent with that approach.
With respect to banking procedures, the most important change was the
elimination of the requirement that a bank obtain permission from the
Comptroller prior to engaging in financial futures transactions.6 While
lifting the "permission" requirement, the Comptroller placed into effect
new regulatory and accounting controls designed to prevent unauthoriz-
ed futures trading and other potential abuses by bank personnel. 2
Indicative of the change in attitude toward bank trading of financial
futures contracts was the Comptroller's pronouncement that it viewed
such contracts as "neither inherently prudent or imprudent," and the
declaration that such contracts may be effectively used to reduce a
bank's risk and exposure to interest rate fluctuations.63 Additionally,
abandoning the requirement of specific correspondence between finan-
cial futures and cash positions allowed a more flexible use of financial
futures in the context of administration of a bank's entire investment
portfolio. By eliminating the position-by-position approach and hedging
an entire portfolio in the aggregate, a bank could reasonably ensure
that the net effect of its financial futures trading would be a reduction
rather than an increase in the bank's risk.
Despite the numerous revisions contained in the 1980 Circular,
neither the Revised Banking Circular 4 nor the joint Federal Reserve
Board-Comptroller of the Currency-Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion Policy Statement" lifted the prohibition against banks using futures
activities for speculative purposes. In view of the vigorous enforcement
dent, Chicago Board of Trade from Scott Ryan, Executive Advisor for Banking &
Securities, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (March 19, 1980) at 2. There is no
Generally Accepted Accounting Principle ("GAAP") yet established for futures and for-
wards and in fact, accounting firms have different methods of treating these contracts. This
divergent treatment is clearly unacceptable from a regulatory point of view and it is the
reason the Comptroller felt compelled to establish uniform reporting standards pending the
development of an acceptable GAAP standard.
I American Institute of Certified Public Accountants' ("AICPA") paper, "Accounting
for Forward Placement and Standby Commitments and Interest Note Futures Contracts."
The AICPA proposals were submitted to the Financial Accounting Standards Board in
December 1980.
" See text accompanying notes 34-37 supra.
62 Banking Circular 79 (2nd Rev.), supra note 40, at 82,275-77.
Id. at 84,275.
Banking Circular 79 (2nd Rev.), supra note 40.
Policy Statement, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 45 Fed. Reg.
18,120 (1980); Policy Statement, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 45 Fed. Reg. 18,116
(1980). These policy statements are virtually identical in content to Banking Circular 79 (2nd
Rev.), supra note 40.
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posture taken by the Comptroller of the Currency regarding the federal
banking laws' anti-speculative provisions, all present indications are that
this prohibition will continue.
Expanding the scope of its previous policy statements, the Federal
Reserve Board, in a recent policy statement, warned bank holding com-
panies not to engage in speculative trading in futures contracts, forward
or standby contracts.6 The Board noted that it will monitor closely the
trading activity of the parent holding companies to ensure that their ac-
tivity is consistent with the "safe and sound" banking guidelines." Fur-
ther, holding companies should approve Written policies in connection
with planned futures transactions. 6 Such policies must be within pru-
dent parameters and banks are to establish internal controls and audit
programs to monitor said activity. Of interest is the portion of the
statement which notes that the holding company should consider the in-
terest rate exposure of its non-banking subsidiaries but not that of its
banking arm. Futures activity involving banking subsidiaries are to be
reflected on that bank's books and reports and not that of the parent."
Regulatory and Accounting Controls
Though they represent a liberalization of prior rules and regula-
tions, the Revised Banking Circular71 and the Joint Policy Statement 2
are by no means a carte blanche for any national bank to dive into the
financial futures market. Despite the fact that prior approval from the
Comptroller is no longer a prerequisite to a bank's engaging in financial
futures trading, significant restrictions and controls on the bank's finan-
cial futures trading activity still exist. Because of the vast potential for
abuse by individual bank employees, past abuses in the trading of
foreign exchange contracts (of the kind that led to the demise of the
Franklin National Bank),3 and perhaps a general wariness of this area on
BANK HOLDING COMPANY POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 59.
67 12 C.F.R. § 225.142(e) (1981). Under present requirements a majority of the com-
panies' directors must sign its annual report.
Id. at § 225.142(b).
69 Id.
70 Id. at § 225.142(c).
71 Banking Circular 79 (2nd Rev.), supra note 40. This revised circular is addressed to
national banks only.
7 See note 65 supra. The Federal Reserve Board Statement is addressed to state
banks which are members of the Federal Reserve System. The Federal Deposit Insurance
Company statement is addressed to state non-members.
'3 Losses in foreign exchange transactions, as high as an estimated $37 million, played
a major role in the demise of the Franklin National Bank. The facts leading up to the finan-
cial collapse of the Franklin National Bank, the largest bank failure in United States
history, and the role of the Comptroller of the Currency and the FDIC in handling it are
briefly recounted in In re Franklin National Bank, 381 F. Supp. 1390 (E.D.N.Y. 1974); In re
Franklin National Bank Securities Litigation v. Andersen, 532 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1976);
Huntington Towers, Ltd. v. Franklin National Bank, 559 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1977); and In re
Franklin National Bank Securities Litigation, 445 F. Supp. 723 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
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the part of the national banking authorities, trading in financial futures
is now under rigorous control requirements.
One important change is that the primary responsibility for estab-
lishing and enforcing a particular bank's standards and procedures for
financial futures trading now lies with the bank's board of directors
rather than with the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency.74 Current
regulations require that before a bank makes its first financial futures
trade, the bank must draw up its own written statement that sets out its
financial futures trading policies and procedures.75 Also prior to trading,
the statement must be endorsed by the bank's board of directors and fil-
ed with the Regional Administrator of National Banks." Included in this
filing, besides the written policy statement, must be specific contract
position limits agreed upon by the board of directors and examples of
the blank internal record keeping forms that the bank will use to
monitor its trading.77 The specific contract position limits agreed upon
by the board of directors must include futures and forward trading
limits both for individual traders and on total outstanding contracts.78
The basis for these limits must be fully explained in the bank's submis-
sion to the Regional Administrator.79 Any subsequent deviation from
stated individual or gross trading limits can not be undertaken without
prior written approval from the Comptroller," and then .the trades in
question must be subsequently ratified by the board of directors.8
The written policy statement must specify the bank's trading strate-
gies and how these strategies will meet the required standard of reduc-
ing the bank's risk and overall exposure to interest rate fluctuations.8 2
Furthermore, in line with the restricted statutory basis for permitting
banks to engage in financial futures trading (as part of their "incidental
powers necessary to carry on the business of banking"),3 the policy
statement must outline the interrelationship between the bank's trading
strategies and its other banking activities. The Investment Securities
Examination Procedures section of the Comptroller's Handbook for Na-
tional Bank Examiners sets out the criteria for determining whether
financial futures contracts have a reasonable correlation to a bank's
business needs:
" See Banking Circular 79 (2nd Rev.), supra note 40, at 84,275 and text accompanying
notes 53-55 supra.
' See Banking Circular 79 (2nd Rev.), supra note 40, at 84,275-76.
T' Id. at 84,278.
'Id.
T' COMPTROLLER'S HANDBOOK FOR NATIONAL BANK EXAMINERS, § 203.4 (20) at 2 (Feb.
1980 ed.) [hereinafter cited as COMPTROLLER'S HANDBOOK].
T Id.
" Id. § 203.4(21) at 2.
Id. § 203.4(22) at 2.
n Id. at 2-3.
12 U.S.C. § 24(7) (1976).
1981]
826 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXVIII
(1) Comparison of the contract commitments and their maturity
dates with those of the cash positions being hedged;
(2) Comparison of the amounts of outstanding futures contract
commitments with the amounts of the hedged cash positions;
and
(3) The extent of the correlation between expected interest
rate movements on the futures contracts and on the hedged
cash positions. 4
The bank also must submit detailed descriptions of the internal con-
trol system that has been established to prevent unauthorized trading
and other possible trading abuses.85 Bank record keeping systems must
be sufficiently detailed to permit a National Bank Examiner to deter-
mine whether operating personnel have followed the procedures and
acted in accordance with the stated objectives of the bank's trading
policy." General ledgers should, at a minimum, include the type, amount,
maturity date, cost and current market price of each outstanding finan-
cial futures -contract. Amounts held in margin accounts should be
recorded and these figures should be updated, as should all deferred
gains or losses on contracts held. All traders must use a pre-numbered
trade ticket that records the trade date, the nature of the transaction,
the contract type, the quantity and price of the contract, the reason for
the trade and the appropriate cash positions being hedged.
Generally, the bank should account for all transactions on a mark to
market or lower of cost or market basis. The bank should make an ex-
ception to this general rule only when a financial futures transaction is
specifically linked to a particular investment position. In such cases, the
bank can carry unrealized gains and losses until either the investment
position or the financial futures position is closed out, which ever occurs
first."
The bank should receive periodic statements from the bank's futures
commission merchants ("FCMs") 2 The statements should reflect trading
" COMPTROLLER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 78, § 203.3(17) at 5.
" Banking Circular 79 (2nd Rev.), supra note 40, at 84,278.
" COMPTROLLER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 78, § 203.3(16) at 4.
87 Id.
Id. § 203.4(28) at 2.
Id. § 203.4(24) at 2.
Id. § 203.3(16) at 2; § 203.4(35) at 3.
Id. § 203.4(35) at 3.
The CFTC Act defines a futures commission merchant ("FCM") as, "individuals,
associations, partnerships, corporations, and trusts engaged in soliciting or in accepting
orders for the purchase or sale of any commodity for future delivery on or subject to the
rules of any contract market and that, in or in connection with such solicitation or accep-
tance of orders, accepts any money, securities, or property (or extends credit in lieu thereof)
to margin, guarantee or secure any trade or contracts that result or may result therefrom."
Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
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activity for the period, open positions at the end of the period and the
position's market value, any unrealized gains and losses and any cash
balances in bank accounts." The bank should prepare weekly reports for
an appropriate committee of the board of directors and these reports
should reflect the same information contained in the FCM's statements. 4
The bank's internal control .system should have features that
separate the trading, record keeping and trading review functions, so as
to prevent any unauthorized trading and/or bank employee abuse of the
bank's trading system for personal gain. At the same time,.the bank's in-
ternal controls should be adequate to assure adherence to the bank's
written trading policy. 15 Only authorized trained personnel' should
engage in actual trading. Trading procedures authorized and approved
by the bank's board of directors should be formalized and documented in
a bank manual." The bank should notify its FCMs in writing ihat they
may trade with only those persons whom the bank informs the FCM are
authorized traders. 7 Any time a bank employee's authorization to trade
for the bank is revoked, the bank should notify the appropriate FCM in
writing immediately.98
Accounting records should be maintained and controlled by non-
trading personnel.99 Incoming trade confirmations should be received by
someone independent of both the trading and record keeping functions
and verified to the trade tickets by that person.' ° Similarly a person in
the same independent position should receive the FCM statements and
reconcile the statements to all the bank's accounting records as well as
to price listings from a published source.' Detailed subsidiary ledgers
should support all financial futures trading activities and the bank
should post the amounts daily to the general ledger.' Internal auditors
should perform tests periodically to check on the efficacy of bank accoun-
ting and control procedures. The bank must also document all the re-
quired accounting procedures in a procedures manual.'
Bank Trust Accounts
National banks which serve in a trustee capacity for various
customer trust funds (i.e., Pension Funds, Institutional Investment
Trusts, etc.) and which are interested in entering the financial futures
'3 COMPTROLLER'S HANDBOOK, suprdnote 78, § 203.4(30) at 2-3.
" Id. § 203.4 at 3.
" Id. § 203.3(16) at 5.
0 Id. § 203.4(18) at 2.
- Id. § 203.4(19) at 2.
9Id.
9Id. § 203.4(25) at 2.
,1 Id. § 203.4(27) at 2.
... Id. § 203.4(31) at 3.
I"2 Id. § 203.4(29) at 2.
"I Id. § 203.4(26) at 2.
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market for the benefit of the trust funds, must consider not only their
Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA")'T4 and state law
responsibilities, but also promulgations by the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency."5 Under 12 U.S.C. § 92(a), the Comptroller has the authority to
regulate trust activities of national banks. The Comptroller's regulations
regarding trust funds provide that a bank may invest funds, other than
commingled funds, in any investment permitted by the trust instrument
and not in violation of the local laws and applicable ERISA provisions. '
National banks which maintain commingled trust funds are more
limited in the investment area, especially futures trading. The regula-
tions control investment flexibility by a list of permissible transactions
which a bank can make with commingled funds. 7 This list does not make
reference to commodity futures as a permissible vehicle for investments.
However, the regulation leaves the bank with an alternative, by permit-
ting it to "invest the pooled funds in such other manner as may be ap-
proved (in writing) by the Comptroller (emphasis added)." ' 8
The Comptroller's Trust Banking Circulars began to recognize the
economic need of commingled funds to hedge positions in the futures
market, since such funds generally invest in interest rate sensitive short
term financial instruments."9 Comptroller's Staff Interpretive Letter
No. 62 permitted a commingled fund for educational institutions to
hedge its assets with Treasury Bill futures."0 However, the respective
trust dpcuments had to contain language authorizing such transactions
and granting the trustee the necessary powers to so effect them.
Presently, it appears that the Comptroller would not have major ob-
jections to a bank utilizing the financial futures markets for its ERISA
portfolios, provided that the market was being used as a hedge and not
as a speculative vehicle. Since such investments would be protective
tools, the investments reasonably would meet ERISA's "Prudent Rule"
requirements."' The "Prudent Rule" concept was amplified in Trust
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829
(1974) [hereinafter cited as ERISA].
"1 12 U.S.C. § 92a; 12 C.F.R. §§ 9.11-9.22 (1979). See Scott, The Dual Banking System:
A Model of Competition and Regulators, 30 Stan. L. Rev. 1,6 (1977).
10 See generally 12 U.S.C. § 92a and ERISA §§ 514(a) & 514(b)(2)(A); RESTATEMENT (SE-
COND) OF TRUSTS § 816 (1959).
12 C.F.R. § 9.18.
108 Id. See Comptroller of the Currency, Trust Banking Circular No. 14 (June 26, 1979)
reprinted in FED. BANKING L. REP. (CCH) J 59,304 [hereinafter cited as Trust Banking Cir-
cular No. 14].
119 Id. Comptroller of the Currency, Trust Banking Circular No. 2 (December 19, 1979),
reprinted in FED. BANKING L. REP. (CCH) 1 59,292; Comptroller of the Currency, Press
Release No. 15 (November 2, 1976).
110 12 C.F.R. § 9.18 (September 25, 1978), FED. BANKING L. REP. (CCH) 85,137 (Inter-
pretive Letters).
" ERISA § 404(a)(1)(b). See R. MURPHY, R. POSNER, W. CHADWICK, R. MILNE, S. SMIIT,
W. GRAY AND R. BLINT, EVOLVING CONCEPTS OF PRUDENCE: THE CHANGING RESPONSIBILITIES
OF THE INVESTMENT FIDUCIARY IN THE AGE OF ERISA (1976). Although Trust Banking Cir-
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Banking Circular No. 15.112 The circular, among other things, states that
ERISA's "Prudent .Rule" will govern employee plans. However, it is
clear that for the Comptroller to approve trading in financial futures by
such funds, he mtist first be satisfied, by initial and ongoing review, that
the bank's trading policies are consistent with the Rule's intent. Thus,
we can reasonably conclude that if the bank's trading policies are struc-
tured to protect trust assets by hedging, and thelreby satisfy the "Pru-
dent Rule" from a prophylactic viewpoint, the Comptroller's concerns
would be equally satisfied.'
In the winter of 1979-80, the Comptroller issued an approval letter to
Chicago-based Harris Trust & Savings to trade long-term Treasury
Bonds for its commingled, personal trusts."' The letter was the first
known instance of manifested approval by the Comptroller for a bank to
trade futures for its trust department, rather than through a dealer
from its own account activities. Although an official of the Harris bank
was quoted to say that the reason the bank sought approval from the
Comptroller was "just as a matter of policy,""' there are other more con-
sequential reasons for a state bank to seek such approval.
State banks that are members of either the 'Federal Reserve
System, the FDIC, the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corp., or the
Federal Loan Bank may find themselves under overlapping state and
federal jurisdiction. Membership in'such an organization arguably sub-
jects the bank to the Comptroller's regulations as w.ell." 8 Further, should
a state bank seek favorable tax treatment for pooled trust accounts, the
bank certainly will be subject to the rules and regulations of the Comp-
troller and the Federal Reserve."'
Margin Requirements"8
Banks encountering commodities trading practices for the first time
shall have to adjust to the different procedures necessitated by the
cular No. 14, note 108 supra, dealt with "forward contracts," it noted that management of
employee benefit trust funds must be in conformity with ERISA provisions. The conformity
requirement does noi mean that ERISA would preempt the Comptroller's jurisdiction over
the bank administered trust area but that the Comptroller would be primarily concerned
with'the bank's policies governing "forward" transactions in compliance with ERISA.
' Comptroller of the Currency, Trust Banking Circular No. 15 (July 13, 1979),
reprinted in FED. BANKING L. REP. (CCH) 59,305. See CONTROLLER'S HANDBOOK FOR NA-
TIONAL TRUST EXAMINERS, Opinion 9.4070, reprinted in FED. BANKING L. REP. (CCH)
59,251.
"' Modern portfolio theory requirements that one should diversify the types of invest-
ment instruments the portfolio trades or maintains may also withstand the test of the "Pru-
dent Rule." See generally Russo, Bachelder, & Grala, Employee Plan Trading In Commodi-
ty Futures, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 811 (1980).
.. Comptroller Gives Harris Bank Trust Free Run to Trade T-Bond Futures,
SECURITIES WEEK, February 11, 1980, at 9.
ll Id.
See generally 12 U.S.C. § -321 (1976), 12 U.S.C. § 1470 (1976), 12 U.S.C. § 1818, 12
U.S.C. § 1464(n)(1) (Supp. 1 1980).
11 I.R.C. §§ 401, 584(a)(2); Treas. Reg. § 9.18 (1975); Rev. Rul. 56-267, 1956-1 C.B. 206.
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highly volatile nature of such activity. Banks are liable to the FCM for
margins-technically on a daily basis. Margin requirements in the
futures area are vastly different in both amount and function from those
in the securities market."9 In futures trading, margins are not deposits
for securities bought, nor is there any balance owed after a margin pay-
ment has been made. Margin functions in the futures markets as both
earnest money (a good faith deposit) and as a fund that enables fluctua-
tions against a trader's market position to be settled in cash, on a daily
basis. 2 ' Thus, both the buyer and the seller of a futures contract put up
margin money and when either's margin fund falls below a certain level
by a succession of losses, additional margin money is due. In any case,
margin requirements in the futures market are lower, on a percentage of
commitment basis, than in almost any other trading area, and there are
no margin requirements whatsoever in the privately traded forward
placement or standby options markets. 2'
11' On each financial futures contract transaction, both parties to the transaction, the
buyer and seller of the contract, post margin funds. The full transaction price is not
transferred until delivery of the subject securities in the settlement month. The minimum
margin per contract is similar to a performance bond and is determined by the maximum
daily limit on the price fluctuation of the contract. Thus margins on financial futures tran-
sactions are not downpayments or payments for equity. There is no interest due on any "un-
paid balance." The contract is marked to market on a daily basis and there is a consequent
daily cash settlement of gain or loss on the contract that flows from the loser to the gainer
reflecting that day's price fluctuations in the contract's value. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER
OF THE CURRENCY, FUTURES & FORWARDS TRAINING MATERIALS, FUTURES LESSON PLAN,
Definitions (1980). When the aggregate of such settlements deplete the initial margin below
a fixed variation "maintenance" margin level, the margin fund must be replenished, at least
up to the variation margin level, by the party who has sustained the losses on the contract.
The replenishment must occur before the start of the next day's trading session. See COmM.
FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 1 317, at 1064-1065 (1979).
119 Margins in the securities market are downpayments on securities purchased. In-
terest is owed on the unpaid balance of the securities' purchase price. Margin requirements
for such purchases are a fixed percentage of the purchase price of the securities at the time
they are purchased and have no relation to possible subsequent price movements in the
value of the securities. Money is owed by the buyer to the securities dealer through whom
the purchase was made, not to any seller of the securities involved.
12 See note 119 supra.
121 Lower margin requirements are not the only significant difference between the for-
ward placement/standby option market and the financial futures market. Financial futures
transactions are conducted on an exchange with the clearing house acting as the other party
to each participant. Forward placement and standby contracts are made directly between
the two parties involved without any outside involvement. Futures contracts are traded on
standardized terms, their price determined by the freely competitive marketplace. For-
ward and standby contracts can be freely negotiated and made up to suit the specifications
and particular needs of each party, their price determined only by each party's relative
bargaining position and negotiating ability.
Finally, there is a distinction between the subject matter of futures and forward trans-
actions. A forward contract is a sales contract for the sale of a security that is delivered on a
specific date in the future. A futures contract is a contract to deliver a security on a specific
future date pursuant to a sale to be executed at that time, on terms presently agreed upon.
Whatever the distinction, empirical tests show that a far greater percentage of forward
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Proposed legislation in Congress may make margin requirements for
futures trading even more complex.'22 Legislation introduced by Senate
Banking Committee Chairman, William Proxmire, would have margin re-
quirements for financial futures trading set by the Federal Reserve
Board.' Chairman Volcker of the Federal Reserve Board has expressed
reluctance to assume the heavy responsibility entailed in such a complex
regulatory program.'24
Legal Liabilities
Banks entering the financial futures market should consider the
wide range of potential legal liability which they may incur from trading
in financial futures. Under the Financial Institutions Regulatory and In-
terest Rate Control Act of 1978,125 the Comptroller of the Currency has
the power to assess maximum penalties of up to $1,000 a day for viola-
than futures contracts have resulted in actual delivery of securities rather than settlement
by pairing-off before the contract settlement date. Thus, although the futures market is
safer because of the characteristics mentioned above, some participants prefer the less stan-
dardized and more flexible forwards market especially if the initial and daily margin re-
quirements of the futures market pose a problem. See note 118 supra.
'" Senator William Proxmire, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs, introduced S.2074 in 1980. The bill would have amended the Federal
Reserve Act to authorize the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to
establish margin requirements for transactions in financial instruments. S.2074, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess. § 23B(a) (1980). The margin requirements would cover both downpayments on cash
purchases of financial instruments and minimum deposit requirements in connection with a
futures contract involving a financial instrument. Id. The bill also provided that the Board
would require all market participants to submit detailed reports on their trading activities,
and that all federal agencies collecting information on these markets make that information
available to the Board at its request. Id. § 23B(b). Finally, the bill gave the Board the power
to seek injunctions for violations of "this section or the rules and regulations thereunder."
Id. § 23B(c). The bill imposed fines of up to $100,000 or prison terms of up to five years for
willful violations. Id. § 23B(e).
One of the most interesting aspects of the bill was its broad definitions. The bill defined
"financial instrument" as any security not otherwise subject to the Board's margin author-
ity under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Securities that fall within that category are
"any currency, security or other evidence of indebtedness not subject to the provisions of
section 7 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, gold bullion, silver bullion, bulk gold coins,
bulk silver coins, or any other article, contract or right which the board determines has
monetary characterisitic or is a store of value, but such term does not include any
agricultural commodity." Id. § 23B(f)(1). "Futures contract" was defined by the bill as "a con-
tract for the future delivery of any financial instrument which is traded on any contract
market or similar entity located in the United States." Id. § 23B(f)(2). Although extensive
hearings were held on S.2074, neither house of the 96th Congress passed the bill and it is not
known at this time whether Senator Proxmire or anyone else intends to re-introduce it in
any form in the new Congress.
122 S.2074, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). See note 122 supra for a full discussion of the
bill's provisions.
12 See FED. BANKING L. REP. (CCH) at 4 (Other Legislative Action) (Letter of June 5,
1980); CoMI. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) at 3 (Other Developments) (Letter of June 4, 1980).
11 Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-630, 92 Stat. 3641 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. (Supp. I1 1979)).
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tions of any provisions of the National Bank Act.126 The Comptroller may
assess the penalty not only against a violating bank, but against any
bank officer director, employee or agent who violates the law. Possible
liability in the financial futures area may accrue not only to the bank, its
officers, directors and employees, but to any FCM carrying the account
of a bank that trades financial futures for speculative rather than risk
reducing purposes.127 In addition, all of the above-mentioned parties are
subject to a cease and desist order if the Comptroller of the Currency,
the Federal Reserve Board or the FDIC"' deems it appropriate. Bank of-
ficers and directors are also subject to a removal order on a finding that
an act, practice or violation by the individual caused substantial financial
loss to the bank and that such act, practice or violation demonstrated a
willful or continuing disregard for the safety or soundness of the bank."
All those acting on the bank's behalf should consider these liabilities
before engaging the bank in any financial futures trading activity and
especially before departing from either the Comptroller's guidelines or
the bank's own written trading policies and procedures.
Furthermore, the parent holding company of a bank may be obli-
gated to disclose any material fact(s) relating to bank's trading activity
to the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), possibly other
agencies and to its shareholders through the various filings and
shareholder reports. 130 A failure to properly disclose material facts may
trigger enforcement proceedings by the SEC (and possibly other agen-
cies), as well as potential shareholder lawsuits based on violations of
federal and state securities laws."3' The bank's outside auditors are also
.2 Id. at § 103(1 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 93(b)(1) (Supp III 1979)).
.2 Id. The FCM's liability would come under the statutory category of "agent ... par-
ticipating in the conduct of the affairs of such [national banking] association." Id.
'8 Id. at § 107(a)(1) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(1) (Supp. III 1979)).
12 Id. at § 107(a)(1) (codified at 12 U.S.C. 1818(e)(1) (Supp. III 1979)).
' Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, issuers of securities must file: annual
reports, referred to as Form 10-K, that include audited balance sheets, statements of in-
come, and statements of source and application of funds covering the last two fiscal years.
Any securities held by the bank as a result of futures or forward trading activity would
have to be described in the summary of operations in the 10-K report. The issuer must also
file quarterly reports, referred to as Form 10-Q, which are condensed financial statements
which include an income statement, a balance sheet and statement of source and application
of funds. A management analysis of income statements and additional financial information
of significance to investors must also be included and these may contain references to the
bank's financial futures or forward transactions. Any other materially important events
such as large bank losses in connection with futures or forward trading must be the subject
of a Current Report, Form 8-K, filed within 10 days after the close of the month during
which the event occurred. The issuer would also have to include a report of the loss in Part
II of the 10-Q filing. 1 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 174 (1977).
138 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1976) (civil liability to shareholders for misleading
statements in registration statement); Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3230 (1942)
(Rule 10b-5) (civil liability for material false statements made in connection with purchase or
sale of any securities).
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placed in a sensitive position as they too must be aware of and vigilant to
the possibilities for accounting sleight of hand and bookkeeping magic
hiding the true nature of a bank's financial futures trading activities."2
In addition to the potential liability flowing from any losses con-
nected with failure to adequately structure and follow through on the
elaborate accounting and control provisions presently mandated, there
is the greater potential that the written policies and procedures created
'and adopted by the bank will prove inadequate to prevent unauthorized
activity. Inadequate policies may also contribute to substantial losses in
financial futures trading. In such cases, both the bank and the individual
members of the bank's board of directors who have personally approved
these policies may be open to lawsuits by bank depositors and share-
holders."
Regulatory Horizon
The 1978 renewal of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Act"3 directed the CFTC to seek the advice of the Treasury Department
and the Federal Reserve before authorizing any additional futures con-
tracts in U.S. Government securities."5 To assist them in meeting their
statutory obligations, the Treasury Department and the Federal
Reserve recently commissioned a joint study.' The study addressed
two distinct but related problems. First, the study examined a possible
adverse effect of futures trading on the efficiency and integrity of the
underlying cash market for U.S. Government securities. Second, the
study considered the possibility that the existence of a futures market
which relies on the presumption that there will always be a deliverable
supply of government securities may possibly have the effect of limiting
the Treasury's flexibility in issuing government securities and managing
the national debt. 37
"I See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Escott v. BarChris Con-
str. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85
(D.R.I. 1968).
" See note 73 supra, citing cases involving the financial collapse of the Franklin Na-
tional Bank where both the bank and members of its Board of Directors were sued by bank
holding company shareholders for losses suffered by the bank in its foreign exchange
trading activities.
11 Futures Trading Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-405, 92 Stat. 885 (codified in scattered
sections of 5, 7 U.S.C. (Supp. III 1979)).
7 U.S.C. 4a(g)(2)(i) (Supp. IH 1979).
1s8 TREASURYIFEDERAL RESERVE STUDY OF TREASURY FUTURES MARKETS (1979)
[hereinafter cited in TD/FRB STUDY].
'" See generally id. The apprehension concerning the Treasury's ability to manage the
national debt centers on a scenario whereby it becomes apparent that certain individuals,
by taking large cash, forward and futures positions in certain Treasury Bills, have been suc-
cessful in cornering or at least squeezing the market for the Treasury Bills deliverable
under a particular futures contract. The resultant shortage of supply and unnaturally high
prices in that market would lead to an ever-worsening crisis as the date approaches when
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On the first point, the study concluded that the futures market had
only a salutary effect on the cash market for government securities, act-
ing as a safety valve for the relief of pressures built up in the cash
market.13 The evidence showed that if any influence was exerted by ac-
tivity in one market on the prices in the other, it was likely to be the
cash market that influenced the futures market, not vice-versa.' The
study found no evidence that the futures market diverted investment
funds from the cash market; on the contrary, the futures market with its
hedging capabilities has acted to reduce the risk and thus encourage the
growth of investment in the cash market.14 Finally, the study concluded,
given the structure of current futures contracts,"' there was "minimal"
likelihood that Treasury Bond prices could be manipulated by specula-
tors acting jointly in the cash market and the futures market."4 The
authors of the study could not be as sanguine about the likelihood of
manipulation in the prices of the 3-month Treasury Bills.4 Citing inter-
views with market participants, the study indicated that dealer position-
ing strategies, executed in both the cash and futures markets, may have
succeeded in "squeezing" the secondary market price on one or two new
issues of 3-month Treasury Bills.144
The study also considered the possibility that the futures market
may have an inhibiting effect on the Treasury's exercise of its unfetter-
ed discretion in the management of the national debt. The study conclud-
ed that if the various futures exchanges were able to act quickly and ef-
fectively in dealing with any pending crises of supply, the needs of the
futures market should never influence the Treasury in its debt market-
ing decisions. 4 ' Although the exchanges have specific rules and proce-
delivery would have to be made under the outstanding futures contracts for the issue. At
that point if the exchanges did not step in to allow other comparable securities to be
delivered under the contract calling for the delivery of the cornered or squeezed issue, the
Treasury would be faced with a dilemma. If it proceeded with a debt issue of the small size
necessary to cover the government's money needs, there would be too few securities to
deliver under the outstanding futures contracts, and the market manipulators would have
profitted greatly from their successful cornering or squeezing scheme. If, on the other hand,
the Treasury issued enough securities to "break" the corner or squeeze, it would have
issued more debt than necessary for the government's money need and wasted the tax-
payers' money on interest paid out on unnecessary debt.
Id. at 11-12.
"3 Id. at 12.
140 Id.
"I Future contracts for the delivery of Treasury Bonds may specify a "market basket"
of bonds that are deliverable under the contract. A "market basket" contract may be fulfill-
ed by the delivery of a few different issues of Treasury Bonds, rather than just one specific
issue, each of which falls into a specified maturity range. For example, contract might pro-
vide that any Treasury Bond that matures 15-20 years from the date of delivery would
qualify for the "market basket."
142 TD/FRB STUDY, supra note 136, at 15.
"I Id. at 14.
144 Id.
141 Id. at 15-17.
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dures for dealing with such emergencies, the study questioned how ag-
gressively the exchanges would implement them in cases of pending
emergency. 4 '
Although the study pointed out that no bank has yet failed as a
result of involvement in financial futures, the study noted that trading in
GNMA forward and standby contracts has threatened the solvency of
some banks and that injudicious trading in commodity futures lead to
the failure of a large U.S. bank's foreign banking subsidiary. 4 ' Despite
the obvious distinctions between the forward and financial futures
market,4 ' these experiences do indicate the propriety of imposing addi-
tional safeguards on financial futures transactions.
The study recommended that in considering proposals for new
futures contracts, the CFTC consider the probable supply and availabil-
ity of the Treasury issues involved, with a view to making successful
futures market "squeezes" or "corners" unlikely.' The study also re-
commended enactment of "Sunset" provisions requiring the FTC to
review and reauthorize new contracts every few years. The study sug-
gested that the FTC should deny approval for any futures contract
dependent for its deliverable supply solely on a particular security yet
to be issued. '° In general, the study recommended that single security
contracts be discouraged in favor of so called "market basket""1 ' con-
tracts that assure a broader deliverable supply of securities by pro-
viding that more than one issue can be delivered in satisfaction of a
futures contract.'52 To minimize the possibility of manipulation, the
study suggested improved data collection and monitoring of interactions
between the futures and cash markets.51 Finally, the study recom-
mended in general, a "go slow" policy for the CFTC in authorizing addi-
tional financial futures contracts and proposed a joint CFTC, SEC and
Treasury Department study of exchange regulations and investor pro-
tection measures, such as customer suitability standards, margin re-
quirements and position limits. '54
The prospect of financial futures trading becoming increasingly
regulated should the above recommendations be followed, should not
deter bank involvement in financial futures transactions. In fact, the
financial futures market will become more attractive and suitable to
banks. If the study's recommendations are rationally followed, the entire
146 Id.
II Id. at 18.
,, See notes 121 & 183 supra and accompanying text.
m TD/FRB STUDY, supra note 136, at 19-20.
" Id. at 20.
,' See note 141 supra.
112 TD/FRB STUDY, supra note 136, at 19-23.
15 Id.
14 See generally TD/FRB STUDY, supra note 136.
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marketplace will become safer and less subject to manipulation and
abuse.
An interesting and fruitful comparison can be made between the
financial futures market and the forward market, which fulfills the same
economic functions as the futures market, with respect to their existing
and proposed regulatory structures and the attitudes taken toward
those structures by the various federal agencies that oversee them. The
existing and proposed futures market regulatory structures have been
outlined above along with the attitudes of the Treasury Department and
Federal Reserve Board toward them, as reflected in their 1979 joint
study of futures markets.'55 While the difference between the way the
futures and forward markets operate has been noted above,15 an ex-
amination of two recent studies by the federal agencies that oversee the
forward market will illustrate the differences in the two markets' cur-
rent regulatory structures. The studies also explain why those agencies
now favor a new regulatory structure for the forward market that will,
for market participants, drastically reduce the existing differences in
the way the two markets operate.
In 1978 the Department of Housing and Urban Development
("HUD") commissioned a study of the forward market for GNMA securi-
ties"'57 that recommended the maintenance of the status quo regulatory
situation in the forward market."8 The study specifically recommended
that, while HUD should encourage and promote any industry efforts at
self-regulation, the agency should oppose any legislative proposals for in-
creased federal regulation'5 9 before the industry has tried self-regula-
tion.160 The study warned that federal regulatory oversight would have
to be imposed on the forward market if the GNMA forward dealers did
not develop a workable and effective self-regulatory structure within a
reasonable time.1
The noble experiment in allowing the Ginnie Mae forward dealers to
develop an effective self-regulatory structure apparently failed. Two
years after the HUD study, a joint study of the Treasury Department,
the Federal Reserve Board and the SEC,' noting the serious abuses in
the trading of Ginnie Mae forwards, 6 ' called for significant revisions in
155 Id.
1" See note 121 supra.
"7 HUD REPORT, supra note 27.
"I Id. at 179. The status quo regulatory situation is a market that is virtually
unregulated by any government agency other than the SEC. The SEC has always had the
authority to initiate proceedings against dealers suspected of fraudulent, manipulative or
deceptive practices.
159 Id. at 180-81.
' Id. at 196-97.
1a1 Id.
.62 REPORT OF THE JOINT TREASURY- SEC-FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD STUDY OF THE
GOVERNMENT RELATED SECURITIES MARKETS (1980) [hereinafter cited as JOINT REPORT].
"I See id. at 104-75.
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the regulation of the forward market.' Significantly, the study singled
out the lack of margin requirements in the forward market, the most im-
portant element distinguishing the forward from the futures market, as
a practice which has resulted in a high degree of speculation. The
increased speculation from the absence of margin requirements accord-
ingly caused losses to market participants in cases where abusive prac-
tices were present. ' The study's recommendation of increased regula-
tory oversights and more defined controls on forward market operations
can be interpreted as an endorsement of the greater safeguards built
into the futures market regulatory and control structure.
The study suggests a regulatory scheme in which the Federal
Reserve Board has residual rulemaking authority for margin require-
ments in forward transactions. In the new scheme any margin rules the
Federal Reserve promulgates would take precedence over those of the
proposed rulemaking board. 6 ' If Congress gave such authority to the
Federal Reserve Board and the Federal Reserve Board issued rules as to
margin requirements in the forward market, such rules might be made
applicable as well to the futures markets for the same securities.
If the study's recommendation of mandatory margin requirements
for forward transactions is followed, 6 ' there would be a virtual disap-
pearance of any significant practical difference between direct party-to-
party forward transactions and the trading of futures contracts on
organized exchanges and boards of trade. 8' Although it seems that the
elimination of any difference between the two markets could only have a
negative impact on the futures market, it is at present impossible to
predict how large that impact would be. While forward trading would
lose what many forward market participants consider to be the forward
market's primary advantage over futures trading, it would gain the safe-
ty that previously attracted the most prudent investors to the futures
market. Thus, the futures market might lose some of its most prudent in-
vestors to the forward market.'69 Despite margin requirements, the for-
'" Id. at 4-6. The Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation ("FHLMC") is a wholly-
owned subsidiary of the Federal Home Loan Bank System. Congress created the FHLMC in
1970 to issue and guarantee securities backed by pools of conventional (i.e. nonfederally in-
sured or guaranteed) mortgages originating with member banks of the Federal Home Loan
Bank System. Id. at 17-83. The FHLMC program for federally guaranteed mortgage backed
pass-through securities and the GNMA program operate in very similar manners. One dif-
ference between the two programs is that the FHLMC is both the issuer and guarantor of
the securities while the GHMA functions only as a guarantor. See notes 3, 27-29 supra on
the GNMA program.
16 JOINT REPORT, supra note 162, at 3, 206.
16 Id. at 5, 226-27.
Id. at 216.
16 See note 121 supra on the existing differences between the futures and forwards
markets.
"' The precise net effect of mandatory margin requirements is not easily foreseen, but
it seems likely that the forward market will lose some of its more speculative and under-
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ward market would retain the advantage of relative flexibility in the
amount, duration and other terms of the contracts being traded since
they are negotiated individually by the parties involved in each transac-
tion rather than standardized by the exchanges on which they are trad-
ed.17° At the same time, those traders who could not afford the margins
in the forward market would find the margin requirements of the fu-
tures market similarly inhibitive. 171 Since there is no way of measuring
how large a group might be involved in each of the market shifts outlin-
ed above, the overall significance of these shifts on the continued health
and vitality of the futures market cannot be determined at this time.
The joint study also recomniended the creation of two new regula-
tory bodies to oversee the forward market. The proposed Federal Mort-
gage Backed Securities Rulemaking Board ("Board") would be composed
of representatives of both bank and non-bank dealers and of public re-
presentatives including investors.1 72 The proposed legislation would re-
quire dealers in forward transactions for government mortgage-backed
securities to join and be subject to the rules by this self-regulatory
organization.1 7 The Board would promulgate rules to be followed by
brokers and dealers of forwards, subject to the oversight of the Govern-
ment Related Securities Oversight Council ("Council"), which would
have the power to amend, disapprove or make substitutions for these
rules. 4 The Board would have the authority to set both initial margin
and maintenance margin requirements for forward trading.' The initial
and maintenance margins would function much as futures margins do. 6
The Board could also establish financial responsibility and fair practice
standards, including suitability and disclosure requirements, and other
rules governing dealer operations.
7
The Council, composed of the Secretary of the Treasury, the Chair-
man of the Federal Reserve Board and the Chairman of the SEC or their
respective designees 71 would also be required to request and consider
capitalized participants, and perhaps attract the most prudent type of investor who
previously confined his trading activities to the futures market. Thus a net gain in safety
and reliability seems assured for the forward market, although the overall impact on it of
proposed new margin requirements remains clear. See, e.g., note 4 supra and accompanying
text.
170 Id.
"I See note 118 supra.
112 JOINT REPORT, supra note 162, at 4.
" Id. at 224.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 4-5.
11 See note 118 supra.
Ill JOINT REPORT, supra note 140, at 5, 218. Other rules governing dealer operation
might include competency and qualification requirements for dealers, brokers and their
employees; registration and reporting requirements; and disciplinary and enforcement
mechanisms. Id. at 218.
17 Id. at 5.
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the views of the Secretary of HUD, the Government National Mortgage
Association and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation.17 9
Brokers and dealers would have to register with the Council which
would delegate this registration function to the SEC.'80 Finally, the
Council, upon unanimous vote, would be granted the authority to extend
the regulatory structure to encompass cash market transactions or
other government related securities should that become necessary or ap-
propriate.'1
Conclusion
Because in the past certain banks have suffered great losses on
GNMA forward transactions where abusive practices were present,
banks have been reluctant to engage in both forward and futures trans-
actions. The presence of organized exchanges, clearing houses and
margin requirements in the futures market have provided more than
adequate safeguards against the type of abuses that the forward market
has experienced. Increased awareness of the high risks involved in for-
ward trading and increased vigilance by the SEC, the national banking
agencies, dealers, and banks themselves in this area has resulted in a
reduced likelihood that such abuses will persist.'8' Finally, the proposed
new regulation of forward markets will effectively close off the possibili-
ties for abuse that have been most often exploited in the past.
As the past few years have dramatically demonstrated, interest
rates are unlikely to return to the stable patterns of ten and twenty
years ago when they fluctuated only gently and within a relatively narrow
range. The persistent pressures of worldwide inflation will not disap-
pear. In the coming months and years, banks will recognize that they
may be needlessly exposing themselves to tremendous risks if they fail
to provide for interest rate fluctuations by hedging their cash positions
on the futures and forward markets.'83 The old image of futures trading
,, Id. at 221.
' Id. at 5, 223.
151 Id. at 6, 222-23.
12 Id. at 208.
' On July 2, 1981, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board issued a final rule amending its
regulation and policy governing the use of interest-rate futures. Institutions affected by the
change must be insured by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation. The
amendments became effective July 10, 1981.
Under the amendments, insured Savings and Loan institutions ("S&Ls") are permitted
to engage in futures transactions which will reduce their interest rate exposure due to fluc-
tuations. Among other procedures S&Ls which are engaged in mortgage writings are per-
mitted to establish long futures positions against their forward commitments to sell mort-
gages not yet initiated. These "long position hedges", however, will be limited by an "asset
rule" which prohibits long positions for "spreading" techniques. S&Ls are now permitted to
utilize financial futures contracts which are approved by the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission and which have as the underlying commodity a security in which the S&L is
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as something confined to pits of hollering commodities traders bidding
and dickering over the price of agricultural products yet to be grown is
gone forever. Sophistication in the uses and strategies of forward and
futures trading has increased and any bank that has not yet, or will not
soon, acquaint itself with them will find itself rapidly lagging behind its
more innovative competitors.
The financial futures area is no longer a frontier of banking or in-
vestment. It is a necessary adjunct to those activities in times such as
these of volatile fluctuations in interest rate levels. Recognizing this, the
federal banking agencies, CFTC, HUD and the SEC have begun respond-
ing to the need to regulate these burgeoning markets, which will become
even more essential and active in the future.
However, the response must be coupled with an objective, even
handed evaluation of the proposed regulations' effects on the economic
factors of the marketplace, the utilization of the particular instrument
being regulated, the effect on the user/investor of the marketplace and,
of course, the complexities and costs associated with complying with the
promulgated rules and regulations. To a significant extent potential
users/investors of the marketplace must also become aware of and learn
the proper and safe way of utilizing the futures and forward markets to
their benefit. The user/investor should play an increasingly active role in
assisting the various governmental agencies in formalizing an acceptable
regulatory framework within which the system can safely and efficiently
function.
Financial futures trading is not an activity that a bank should
engage in without a great deal of prior thought and preparation. Futures
trading, however, can be an effective tool for reducing the bank's finan-
cial vulnerability in times of economic instability and fluctuating inter-
est rates. Quality services, trained personnel, controls and monitoring
systems may prevent and/or deter to a significant extent, internal il-
legalities and errors, which may otherwise haunt a poorly structured
venture into institutional financial futures trading.
authorized to invest and/or trade. Example of such securities are CD's, Treasury Bills,
Treasury Notes, and GNMA's. Further, the new rules permit S&Ls to defer and amortize
the profits or losses from futures positions over the expected life of the corresponding cash
assets and liabilities. The overall impact of these changes are similar in nature to those af-
fecting federally chartered banks. 12 C.F.R. §§ 545, 563, 571 (1981). See generally, Little,
The Two Edged Sword: Using Financial Futures for Risk Aversion or Risk Taking, PEN-
SIONS AND INVESTMENTS (August 13, 1979).
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